Mindfulness (Bloomsbury Revelations) by Martin Heidegger

Author:Martin Heidegger [Heidegger, Martin]
Language: eng
Format: azw3, epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2016-02-25T05:00:00+00:00

BE-ING AND BEING

[G199] 66. Being – Framed in Predicate (“the Categorial”)

Be-ing is and will nonetheless never be a being. Being of a being – as what is spoken to and from this being, that is, the predicate – claims be-ing insofar as the asserting pronouncement always already has to hold itself in the open and address what is un-covered beforehand as a being in its “that” (it “is”) and “so” and “so” (“is”). That which is framed in the predicate and only in it (being as beingness) is the “categorial”. The “categorial” can and must be framed in the predicate because predicating will be subsequently determined as an assertion that the “subject” makes about objects, and this assertion proceeds along the track and the bridge of the subject-object-relation, and is especially grasped as “subjective” (belonging to the subject) and as “objective” (as determinedness of the object) and precisely because of this, it is sometimes grasped only as the subjective or sometimes only as the objective. And finally, as a finite relation, the subject-object-relation can begin out of an infinity that overcomes both the immediateness and the one-sidedness of the mere object- and subject-relation, and through such a fundamental overcoming it achieves the sway of the absolute subjectivity.

Subject–object-relation itself is grounded in truth as correctness and correctness is grounded in representing beings in their beingness (man as animal).

But what does it say about be-ing itself that be-ing leaves it to beings to be named through beingness and to be interpreted exclusively as being out of beingness?

Beingness (constancy and presence) claims to make up the sway of being and thus to determine “beings”, and in opposition to itself to determine that which becomes. But whence the “opposition”, if an ‘other’ is not posited through beingness? And how can this be, if beingness itself is not a decision in favor of a measure that beingness itself wants to give (that only the “eternal” and “that which is present” actually “is”)? And how can this decision be [G200], if this decision does not separate possibilities and does not withdraw itself from the separation as well as from the separated by not heeding the sphere of decision (of time-space) and fundamentally forgetting that it has nevertheless claimed the temporal?

But where does the decision come from regarding beingness as the sway of being? Does be-ing foster a decision by relinquishing being as beingness to beings? And if so from whom? From man as ζῷον νοῦν (λóγον) ἔχον – from the one who only through this decision and upon this decision as a ground comes to his ownmost without grasping and taking over the swaying ab-ground, perhaps only to begin thereafter a flight from the ownmost (cf. there).

But of what sway is this decision, that is, the decision that concerns the choice of the sway and the taking over the sway? Which “being” can then take over what is ownmost to itself and at the same time also flee from it?

What must “enown” itself here? Must not

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